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Cooperation is only beneficial if the outcome is equally shared between individuals
involved in the cooperative interaction. A mechanism to limit the development of
unequal cooperation is inequity aversion, the negative reaction to unequal treatment.
While inequity aversion has been studied extensively across many animal species, it
remains unclear whether inequity aversion elicited in experimental settings is directed
to the cooperative partner animal or rather to the experimenter distributing the rewards
unequally. In the current study we aimed to further investigate whether the presence
of an experimenter distributing rewards is essential in order to elicit inequity aversion in
dogs. We tested 22 dog dyads in an inequity task, requiring dyads to alternately press a
buzzer in order to receive rewards of equal or unequal value. We manipulated the extent
of the experimenter’s involvement in the task: in the experimenter-present version an
experimenter gave a command to the dogs to press the buzzer and delivered the rewards
by pushing the bowls into the dogs’ enclosure. In contrast, in the experimenter-absent
version, no experimenter was visible and the buzzer and bowls were moved from behind
a curtain. We found that dogs did not respond to the unequal treatment regardless of
the experimenter’s involvement in the task. Nonetheless, we found that dogs based
their behavior on frustration and social facilitation in the experimenter-absent version of
the task, suggesting that a social interaction with an experimenter may be one aspect
necessary to elicit inequity aversion. One potential explanation for the absence of inequity
aversion in the experimenter-present version of the task might be the reward delivery
method. Using separate sets of reward bowls for each dog instead of a shared bowl
could have removed a potentially important competitive aspect (i.e., shared resource)
from the inequity paradigm. In addition, delivering the rewards via bowls, rather than
directly handing the rewards to the dogs, might have caused dogs to perceive the task
as less cooperative. These results suggest that both the presence of an experimenter
causing inequity and the inclusion of a competitive or cooperative element in the task
may be basic requirements for eliciting inequity aversion.
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is of clear advantage in order to achieve goals that
cannot be accomplished alone. For example, hunting prey alone
can be fruitless; however, cooperatively hunting with a partner,
or in a group, can significantly increase hunting success, thereby
resulting in a meal for each individual. Nonetheless, cooperation
also entails competitive aspects. For example, following a
successful hunt, competition arises over access to the carcass.
However, there should be a balance between competition and
cooperation; otherwise, cooperation might break down. It has,
in fact, been shown that capuchin monkeys (Brosnan et al.,
2006, 2010b) and chimpanzees (Melis et al., 2006a,b) prefer to
cooperate with more tolerant partners and partners that share
rewards equally, while cooperation ceased with partners that did
not share equally. Consequently, cooperation is only beneficial
for all individuals involved if the outcome of the joint action is
equitable in the long-term. If one of the cooperating individuals
does not receive an equitable share, it may be more beneficial
for them to stop cooperating with these partners and to find
new cooperative partners with a greater capacity to negotiate
an equitable distribution of rewards. Inequity aversion has,
therefore, been proposed to act as a mechanism to detect and
respond to inequity, facilitating the search for partners that divide
rewards more equitably and thereby stabilizing and increasing
the benefit of cooperation over time (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Brosnan, 2011). Recent research has revealed that inequity
aversion is much more common in the animal kingdom than
previously thought with positive results in rats (Oberliessen et al.,
2016), dogs (Range et al., 2009; Brucks et al., 2016), capuchin
monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), chimpanzees (Brosnan
et al., 2005), and possibly crows and ravens (Wascher and
Bugnyar, 2013).
Most studies investigating inequity aversion have used the
so-called “exchange paradigm” as established in the original
study investigating responses to unequal treatments in capuchin
monkeys (Brosnan and deWaal, 2003). Typically, in the exchange
paradigm, two monkeys sitting next to each other are required
to alternately hand back tokens to the experimenter to obtain a
reward. In the crucial inequity condition, the subject receives a
lesser quality reward than the partner despite carrying out the
same task (i.e., handing back the token to the experimenter.
Interestingly, in order for an unequal reward distribution to elicit
a response from a subject, the reward must follow an investment
of effort in a task. For example, while capuchin monkeys showed
no reaction to an unequal reward distribution if the rewards
were handed over for “free” (i.e., without the need to perform a
specific action) (e.g., Roma et al., 2006; Silberberg et al., 2009),
they did show distinct reactions in studies using the exchange
paradigm (e.g., Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Fletcher, 2008), in
which animals had to “work” to obtain a reward. Considering
that captive animals are used to receiving unevenly distributed
food rewards from caretakers without investing effort, but also
without the option to influence this reward distribution, they
might be more used to unequal treatment outside of a task
context, thereby explaining the necessity of a task to elicit equity
concerns (Brosnan et al., 2010a).
Given that dogs demonstrate cooperation with conspecifics
as well as with humans (Ostojic´ and Clayton, 2014), but also
that they demonstrate competitive behaviors (e.g., communal
territorial defense: Bonanni et al., 2011), they represent an
interesting model species to investigate inequity aversion outside
the primate taxa. Importantly, dogs have been shown to react
with aversion to inequity in a modified exchange task, in which
they were alternately asked by an experimenter to give their
paw (Range et al., 2009). Dogs refused to give their paw if
they received nothing while their partner obtained a reward. In
contrast, in a control condition, in which both animals received
the same reward, dogs did not refuse to give their paw, thereby
demonstrating that they are inequity averse. Importantly, the
dogs stopped giving their paw earlier if they saw their partner
receiving a reward while they were not rewarded, compared
to when they were tested in an asocial control in which
they, likewise, received no reward but no partner was present.
Moreover, the subject was also less likely to follow the command
if they were not rewarded but the partner was, compared to the
condition in which both subject and partner were not rewarded.
Interestingly, dogs did not stop the task if they received a reward
of lower quality than their partner, in contrast to capuchins (e.g.,
Brosnan and de Waal, 2003) and chimpanzees (e.g., Brosnan
et al., 2010a) who respond negatively to qualitatively inequitable
food rewards. This might indicate that, to elicit inequity aversion
in dogs, the differences in reward need to be more salient for (i.e.,
no reward for the subject but a reward for the partner).
While some studies investigated the outcome of cooperative
interactions if the reward distribution was unequal (e.g., bar-
pulling paradigm, Brosnan et al., 2006), or allowed the subjects
to control the reward allocation (e.g., Proctor et al., 2013),
most studies utilize simpler exchange-based tasks, which do not
require the animals to interact with each other cooperatively.
In these simple exchange-based tasks, animals are expected
to respond to a command from the experimenter who then
distributes the food. Consequently, it is the experimenter who
distributes the rewards unequally with the conspecific partner
having no direct involvement in the outcome. However, it
remains unclear what the animals’ perception of the human
experimenter’s involvement is. In a recent study we found that,
following inequity conditions, dogs avoid both the experimenter
who is responsible for the inequity, and the partner receiving
the better reward, suggesting that both the human actor and
the conspecific receiver are potentially perceived as cooperating
partners in the interaction (Brucks et al., 2016).
Although dogs have been shown to exhibit inequity aversion,
and to extend their aversion both to the experimenter causing
the inequity and the partner dog involved in the situation, it
is still not known what specific role the experimenter plays in
a dog’s reaction to inequity. While humans do not respond
to unequal treatment if it is caused by a chance-based event
such as a computerized task (Blount, 1995; Hachiga et al.,
2009), or when the experimenter did not witness the effort
invested prior to distributing rewards (Sloane and Premack,
2012), it is unclear whether the same rule applies to inequity
aversion in non-human animals. Specifically, we do not know
whether an experimenter needs to cause inequity by interacting
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with, and rewarding the dogs differentially, or whether the
experimenter is perceived rather as a distributive entity and
the mere fact of seeing the partner receiving a better reward
is sufficient to elicit inequity aversion in dogs. Our aim
in the current study was, therefore, to investigate whether
the presence of an experimenter distributing the rewards is
essential in order for dogs to respond negatively to inequity.
In order to be able to run the same task in the presence
but also in the absence of an experimenter, we designed a
task comparable to the previous successfully used paw-giving
paradigm (Range et al., 2009; Brucks et al., 2016). In this new
inequity paradigm, dog dyads had to alternately press a buzzer
with their paw in order to get access to rewards. We varied
the involvement of the experimenter in the inequity task: in an
experimenter-present version the dogs had to directly interact
with an experimenter, whereas in the experimenter-absent
version, no interaction with an experimenter was necessary.
In the experimenter-absent version of the buzzer task, dogs
were trained to press the buzzer as soon as it was moved
into their enclosure; rewards were delivered from behind a
curtain, which made the experimenter invisible to both dogs,
via bowls connected to sticks. In contrast, in the experimenter-
present version of the task, dogs were trained to press the
buzzer on a verbal and gestural command given by a visible
experimenter sitting in front of them; this experimenter delivered
the food rewards by sliding them directly into the enclosure
via bowls. In both versions of the task, the rewards obtained
for pressing the buzzer differed across test conditions, with
dogs either getting the same reward, one dog getting a better
reward than the other, or one dog getting no reward while the
partner is rewarded. In addition, as in Brucks et al. (2016),
a food tolerance test was conducted directly following the
inequity test, in order to investigate the influence of unequal
treatment on subsequent social behaviors directed toward the
partner dog.
Removing the experimenter from the task setup could
potentially affect dogs’ response to inequity in two ways. One
possibility is that the interaction with the experimenter drives the
response to inequity; thus, if we remove the experimenter from
the setup, the response to inequity should diminish, with the task
being perceived as more chance-based. In this case, dogs may
base their refusals on individual reward expectations (contrast
effect, Reynolds, 1961) rather than comparing outcomes with
the partner. Additionally, we predict that dogs would no longer
show changes in food tolerance toward the partner dog after
unequal treatment (as was found in the experimenter-based
paradigm, Brucks et al., 2016). Another possibility, however, is
that the experimenter is not perceived by the dog as having a
specific role in the inequity task and his/her presence is rather
distracting the dogs from monitoring the partner’s actions. If this
were the case, we would expect dogs to pay more attention to
their partner in the experimenter-absent version, and possibly,
by attending more to the partner, also manifest their inequity
aversion when qualitatively different rewards are delivered. In
this case, after unequal test conditions (reward and quality
inequity) dogs should show a reduced food tolerance toward the
partner dog.
METHODS
Subjects
Forty-four dogs (mean age: 5.0 ± 2.6 years.) of various breeds
and mixes were tested in familiar dyads in this study (see Table
S1). Only dogs living together in the same household for at least
1 year, without showing signs of food aggression, were included.
All tests were conducted between January–October 2014 and
April–July 2016 at the Clever Dog Lab in a test room (7 × 6m).
Ethical approval was obtained from the ethical commission of the
University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna (Approval number:
08/07/97/2013), and owners were required to sign a consent form
prior to testing.
Experimental Procedures
Dogs were tested in familiar pairs using a between subject
design. One experimental group participated in an experimenter-
present version of the buzzer task (i.e., direct interaction with
experimenter; N = 20 dogs), whereas the other group was tested
in an experimenter-absent version of the buzzer task (i.e., no
experimenter visible; N = 24 dogs; see Table S1 for individual
characteristics of dogs). The experimenter was unfamiliar to the
dogs. Twelve dyads (experimenter-present version: N = 8 dyads;
experimenter-absent version: N = 4 dyads) already participated
in another inequity aversion study (Brucks et al., 2016) using a
different paradigm prior to participating in this study. Following
each dyadic test condition a food tolerance test was conducted.
The training procedure was identical for both tasks (see Table 1
for timetable of experimental procedure).
Experimental Setup
The apparatus consisted of two adjacent enclosures (2 × 2m)
covered by large-holed wire mesh (10 × 15 cm) attached to a
wooden frame (see Figure 1A). The front fence had two openings
on the ground level, one for the food bowls (40× 20 cm) and one
opening (25 × 45 cm) for the buzzer (Eaton R© FAK-S/KC11/I).
Given that the investment of effort has been shown to be essential
for animals to respond to inequity (i.e., exchange token vs. reward
for “free”), the buzzer was positioned on a wooden block to
make the action more effortful for the dogs (see Figures 1B,C).
Three different wooden blocks (sizes: 10, 25, and 40 cm) were
used during testing depending on the dog’s size and health
condition [i.e., older dogs (>8 years of age) were given the smaller
blocks]. During testing, both dogs were placed in the two separate
enclosures (sides randomly assigned and counterbalanced across
test sessions). There were always two bowls in front of each,
one bowl for LVR and another bowl for HVR. Both food bowls
were always baited and visible during testing. The rewards were
placed on elevated lids (same color as the bowls) inside the
bowls to enhance the visibility of rewards (see Figures 1B,C).
The bowl with the HVR was always on the inner position (e.g.,
Figures 1B,C, black bowl contained HVR and white bowl LVR).
The owner either left the room during testing (N = 13 dyads) or
was hiding silently together with the two experimenters behind
the curtain (N = 9 dyads). Two invisible and completely silent
experimenters were always positioned behind an opaque curtain
(see Figure 1A). Each experimenter was responsible for moving
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TABLE 1 | Experimental timetable for group of dogs in experimenter-present and -absent version of buzzer task.
Group Training Tests
Days 1–3 Days 4–11 (one test condition per day)
Food preference test Bowl association Buzzer training Buzzer task If social condition:
Tolerance test
Experimenter-present
(N = 20 dogs)
Establish LVR and HVR Associate reward types
with bowl colors
Press buzzer on verbal
+ gestural command
Experimenter gives
buzzer command and
distributes rewards
Sharing of food between dogs
following each dyadic conditionExperimenter-absent
(N = 24 dogs)
Press buzzer when
available in the
enclosure
Buzzer and rewards are
delivered covertly (i.e., no
person in sight, no
commands given)
FIGURE 1 | Buzzer task setup for experimenter-present version: (A) Sketch of buzzer setup from above: Buzzers and bowls are in the starting position, the two
invisible experimenters are sitting behind a curtain, and the visible experimenter is sitting in front of the curtain (only in the experimenter-present version). (B)
Experimenter-absent version: No experimenter is visible and the buzzers and bowls are moved from behind the curtain. The black dog (the partner) has just eaten its
reward, while the buzzer is moved within reach of the subject (the fawn dog) who reaches out to press it. (C) Experimenter-present version: The visible experimenter is
sitting in front of the curtain giving a verbal and gestural command to press the buzzer to the dog on the right (the partner), while the dog on the left (the subject) is
waiting for its turn.
the buzzer and bowls for one dog. The dogs were observed by the
experimenters via webcams; the view provided by the webcams
allowed the experimenters to direct the buzzers through the
openings. In the social version of the buzzer task, an additional
visible experimenter was sitting in front of the curtain giving the
commands to the dogs to press the buzzer and rewarding them
for successful buzzer presses by moving the corresponding bowl
into the dog’s enclosure (see Figure 1C).
Training
Prior to testing (see Table 1 for procedural overview), we
conducted food preference tests with each dog to establish a
low value reward (LVR) and a high value reward (HVR) (see
Supplementary Material for details on procedure). Only reward
types for which both dogs within a dyad had the same preference
were used for the test. Following the preference test, dogs
were trained to associate the two reward types with two bowls
of different shape and color (see Supplementary Material for
detailed descriptions). Additionally, the dogs were trained to
press the buzzer with their paw using a secondary reinforcer and
the LVR (see Supplementary Material for details).
Test Procedure
Each test session started with 5 warm-up trials in order to ensure
that the dogs still remembered the task; the buzzer was moved
into the enclosure and if the dog pressed it, one piece of LVR
was presented on a plastic plate. A plate was used in order to
make thewarm-up trials as different as possible from test trials, in
which the black and white bowls were used. The partner always
completed the warm-up trials first, and then it was the subject’s
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turn. If a dog refused to press the buzzer, another training session
(see training procedure Supplementary Material) was conducted
and the test was postponed until the next testing day. However, if
the problem occurred again the next time, the dyad was excluded
from the study (N = 1). If both dogs successfully completed the
warm-up trials, the test trials started.
The general test procedure was identical for both versions of
the buzzer task. The two bowls were baited behind the curtain
(one piece of HVR/LVR was put in the corresponding bowl) and
pushed in front of the curtain simultaneously but were kept out
of reach of the dogs (35 cm away from the fence). The two buzzers
remained in front of the buzzer openings, out of the reach of
the dogs (20 cm away from the fence). This position of bowls
and buzzers was the starting and end position for each trial (see
Figure 1A). A trial started by moving a buzzer into an enclosure.
In each trial the partner dog was given a command first, followed
by the subject dog. When the buzzer was pressed, the dog was
rewarded with either a piece of LVR or HVR (depending on the
condition) from the bowl. Following this, the bowl and buzzer
were pulled to the starting position. The subject dog’s trial began
by moving the buzzer into the subject’s enclosure; the subject
was rewarded for pressing the buzzer with a reward from one
of the bowls. The reward in the bowl remained available in the
enclosure for 2 s; if it was not consumed in this time, it was
pulled out again and the next trial started. The two experimenters,
invisible to the dogs, were always responsible for baiting the
bowls, pushing them into the starting position, and pulling them
back behind the curtain after a trial was finished. In addition these
two experimenters were responsible for moving the buzzer in
and out of the enclosures in both versions (experimenter-present
and—absent) of the buzzer task. After the buzzer was pushed into
an enclosure, it was left there for 2 s; if the dog did not press
it, it was pulled back to the starting position and then pushed
back into the enclosure again for a further 2 s. This process was
repeated a maximum of 10 times. During the 5th repetition the
out-of-sight experimenter knocked twice on the wooden panel
attached to the buzzer to redirect the dog’s attention toward the
buzzer while it remained inside the enclosure. Following this,
the remaining 5 repetitions were conducted as before (i.e., no
knocking sounds). If the dog refused to press the buzzer after 10
repetitions, the test session was terminated.
In the experimenter-present version of the buzzer task, an
unfamiliar experimenter was sitting in front of the curtain (see
Figure 1C), clearly visible and equidistant from both dogs. The
experimenter gave a specific buzzer command (e.g., “press,”
“paw,” “step,” “up”; same command for both dogs in a dyad)
combined with a pointing gesture (i.e., extending and raising the
arm completely while holding the index finger outstretched; the
right arm was used for the right enclosure and the left arm for
the left enclosure) directed toward the buzzer (see Movie 1 for
procedure). The pointing gesture stopped after 2 s and the arm
was lowered back to the lap. Each time the buzzer was pushed into
the enclosure, the experimenter gave the same command (gesture
+word using the same tone of voice), always avoiding eye contact
with the dogs and without saying or gesturing anything else
except for the command. If the buzzer was pressed within 2
s, the experimenter visibly pushed the respective bowl into the
TABLE 2 | Test conditions for buzzer task (adapted from Brucks et al.,
2016).
Condition Subject Partner
SOCIAL CONDITIONS
Equity (ET) LVR LVR
Quality Inequity (QI) LVR HVR
Reward Inequity (RI) No reward HVR
Food Control (FC) HVR moved, LVR given HVR moved, LVR given
ASOCIAL CONDITIONS
Assessment Control (AC) LVR — *
No-Reward Control (NR) No reward — *
*In the asocial conditions, the LVR bowl was moved into the empty enclosure first before
the subject’s trial started, in order to rule out the possibility that dogs just react to the
movement of the food but the payoff of the partner (see also Range et al., 2009).
enclosure (see Movie 1). The experimenter was responsible for
giving the buzzer command and rewarding the dogs by pushing
the bowls into the enclosures; apart from those actions, she
remained silent and motionless.
In the experimenter-absent version of the buzzer task, the
bowls and buzzers were moved via sticks so that even the
experimenter’s hands were out of sight of the dog (see Figure 1B,
Movie 1).
Test Conditions
Six test conditions were conducted (see Table 2) with 60 trials
per session alternating between subject and partner dog (i.e., 30
trials per dog). We conducted two inequity conditions, one in
which the partner dog received a reward of higher quality than
the subject dog (quality inequity) and one in which the subject
did not receive a reward while the partner did (reward inequity).
Additionally, in order to investigate how dogs react when their
individual reward expectations are not met, we incorporated a
contrast condition (food control, e.g., Brosnan et al., 2005; Brucks
et al., 2016). In this condition, both dogs were first shown the
HVR by moving the bowl closer to the enclosure without making
it accessible to the dogs before pulling it back again and moving
only the LVR bowl into the enclosure. In order to investigate how
the behavior of dogs changes when they are rewarded unequally,
a baseline condition, in which both dogs received the same
LVR reward (equity condition), was carried out. Additionally, in
order to assess whether dogs based their refusal on their own
reward expectations rather than socially comparing outcomes,
and to rule out social facilitation in the reward inequity condition
(enhanced motivation to give paw due to mere presence of
partner), we included an asocial baseline condition (no-reward
condition), in which dogs received no reward for pressing the
buzzer (as in the reward inequity condition); however, no partner
dog was present in the adjacent enclosure. Moreover, another
asocial condition (assessment control) was conducted to establish
that each dog was sufficiently motivated to press the buzzer 30
times in a row. The dogs were randomly assigned to start as
the subject or as the partner prior to testing. Each dog served
as the partner and as the subject during the test; however,
the roles were only reversed in the two last test sessions. The
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order of test conditions was semi-randomized with the exception
that neither the reward inequity (RI) nor the asocial no-reward
condition (NR) were tested in the first session to avoid animals
becoming frustrated at the beginning of testing. Furthermore,
the asocial control conditions were always tested in consecutive
sessions starting with the assessment condition (AC) first. If a
dog refused to continue during a test session, the buzzer-pressing
behavior was reinforced again 5 times using the HVR after the
entire test session was finished. Only one test condition was
carried out per test day, and no more than three tests were
carried out per week. There was at least a 1 day break between
each test.
Tolerance Test
Directly following each social test condition a food tolerance
test was conducted following the procedure of Brucks et al.
(2016). The tolerance tests following the equity and food
control conditions were analyzed for both dogs within a dyad,
whereas the tests following the reward inequity and quality
inequity conditions were analyzed only for the subject dog.
Consequently, six tolerance tests were conducted per dyad. This
tolerance test was included as, we observed in our previous study
(Brucks et al., 2016), dogs did not show behavioral reactions
to inequity if rewards differed in quality; however, they did
show a reduced co-feeding behavior following the inequity
test. This suggests that dogs responded differently following
the inequity test even though they did not react to it during
the test, potentially due to a lack of inhibitory control (i.e.,
they did not reject the inequitable outcomes). Based on these
results, and in order to have an additional measure of dogs’
social behavior following the inequity test, we incorporated this
measure.
A bowl (20 cm diameter) filled with slices from a total of
1.5 sausages was shown to both dogs before the experimenters
guided the dogs, by their collars, out of the enclosures. The
bowl was placed on the ground equidistant from both dogs and
they were released by the experimenters at the same time. We
measured the social tolerance between dogs while feeding from
the bowl. The tolerance test was not conducted for two of the
dyads, as the owners were afraid the test situation would provoke
a fight between their dogs.
Data Analyses
All tests were video recorded and then coded using the Solomon
coder beta (© 2015 by András Péter; http://solomoncoder.com/).
We coded the following variables during the test: number of times
the buzzer was pressed (max. 30), number of buzzer prompts (i.e.,
number buzzer commands given/number of times buzzer was
moved into and out of enclosure until dog pressed it or test was
terminated), gaze duration to partner enclosure (i.e., turning the
head toward the partner enclosure), and stress signals (i.e., any
of the following: yawning, mouth-licking, scratching; see Table
S2 for definitions for those behaviors). Since dogs only refused to
eat a reward in 0.03% of trials, we could not run any statistics on
this variable. In order to take into account the different lengths
of sessions due to refusals, we calculated an average occurrence
rate per trial for the variables gaze to partner enclosure and stress
signals. In the tolerance test we analyzed the duration of co-
feeding, which was defined as simultaneously feeding from the
bowl (i.e., both heads are inside of the bowl), and feeding alone
from bowl (only one dog’s head is in the bowl).
Statistics were performed in R (R Core Team, 2014) using
the package “lme4 (Version: 1-1.7)” (Bates et al., 2015). The
number of buzzer presses across conditions was analyzed using
generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a binomial
error and logit-link function. The data set was split up into
two sets: one including the dyadic conditions (i.e., ET, FC,
QI, RI), and the other set included the unrewarded conditions
(i.e., NR, RI). Dyad was entered as random effect for the
dyadic conditions, and dog identity was entered as random
effect for the unrewarded conditions. The response variable
for the GLMMs consisted of the number of times the dogs
had pressed the buzzer out of the total buzzer commands
given. Additionally, we utilized linear mixed models for
modeling normally distributed continuous variables [average
gaze duration (cube-root transformed), average amount of
stress behaviors (log-transformed), co-feeding and feeding alone
(both reciprocal transformed)]. Task context (experimenter-
present/-absent), condition (ET, FC, QI, RI, and NR) and
condition order, and experience with inequity test (yes, no)
were entered as fixed effects. Classical stepwise backward
regression analyses with likelihood ratio tests (LRT) were used
for retaining only significant factors in the final model. One
person coded all the videos and two people each coded 20%
of the videos (one coded the videos of the experimenter-
present version and one coded the experimenter-absent version)
Cohen’s kappa for frequencies: times buzzer pressed (exp.-
absent version: 0.98, exp.-present version: 1.00), buzzer prompts
(exp.-absent version: 0.98, exp.-present version: 1.00), and stress
signals (exp.-absent version: 0.71, exp.-present version: 0.73);
intra-class correlation coefficient (consistency) for durations:
gaze to partner (exp.-absent version: 0.79, exp.-present version:
0.85), co-feeding (exp.-absent version: 0.90, exp.-present version:
0.97), and feeding alone (exp.-absent version: 0.97, exp.-present
version: 0.87).
RESULTS
Trials Completed across Condition
The number of completed buzzer prompts was not affected by
experience with inequity paradigms [experience × condition
interaction: LRT: dyadic conditions: χ2
(3)
= 0.38, p = 0.945,
unrewarded conditions: χ2
(1)
= 0.39, p = 0.531]. We found a
condition × task context interaction and consequently analyzed
the two versions of the buzzer task separately [LRT: dyadic
conditions: χ2
(3)
= 9.10, p = 0.028; unrewarded condition: χ2
(1)
= 3.65, p= 0.056].
In the experimenter-present buzzer task, we found no session
× condition interaction [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 0.81, p = 0.847]. However,
there was an effect of condition on the number of completed
trials in the dyadic conditions [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 107.27, p < 0.001].
Dogs pressed the buzzer less often in the RI compared to the ET
condition (see Figure 2, Tables 3, 4). However, while again no
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FIGURE 2 | Number of times the buzzer was pressed per test condition
in the experimenter-present (gray) and experimenter-absent (white)
version of the buzzer task. Circles show outliers, black bars indicate median
values, whiskers display upper and lower hinge, and boxes show the
interquartile range. ET, equity; FC, food control; QI, quality inequity; RI, reward
inequity; NR, no-reward control.
session × condition interaction was observed [LRT: χ2
(1)
= 0.09,
p = 0.764], we also found no significant difference between the
RI condition and the NR control condition [LRT: χ2
(1)
= 0.47,
p = 0.491, Table 3], indicating that the animal responded to not
getting a reward rather than the inequity. Based on these results,
no aversion to inequity emerged.
In the experimenter-absent buzzer task, likewise, we found no
condition × session interaction [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 3.45, p = 0.328]
but an effect of condition on the number of buzzer presses in the
dyadic conditions [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 84.81, p < 0.001]. Dogs pressed
the buzzer less often in the FC and RI conditions compared to the
ET condition (see Figure 2, Tables 3, 4). In addition, condition
had an effect on the number of buzzer prompts in the unrewarded
conditions [LRT: χ2
(1)
= 4.00, p = 0.045]. Interestingly, dogs
pressed the buzzer more often in the RI condition than in the
NR control condition (see Figure 2, Tables 3, 4). And again, no
condition × session interaction could be observed [LRT: χ2
(1)
=
0.00, p= 0.961], but no reaction to inequity could be observed.
Stress Behaviors
We found no task context× condition interaction on the average
number of stress signals per trials [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 1.85, p = 0.605];
consequently, the two versions of the buzzer task were analyzed
together. The average number of stress signals was not affected
by test session [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 2.16, p = 0.539]. However, the dogs’
stress levels were different across conditions [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 53.78,
p < 0.001], and dogs exhibited more stress signals in the FC and
RI conditions compared to the ET baseline level (see Tables 3, 5).
For the unrewarded conditions, however, we found a
condition × task context interaction [LRT: χ2
(1)
= 4.54, p =
0.033] on the number of stress signals per trial and analyzed the
two versions of the buzzer task separately. In the experimenter-
present buzzer task, we found that stress behaviors were affected
by the condition [LRT: χ2
(1)
= 12.37, p < 0.001], which is not
explained by a condition × session interaction [LRT: χ2
(1)
=
0.02, p = 0.877]. Dogs were more stressed in the RI condition
compared to the NR condition, suggesting that there seems to
be some sensitivity to the inequity. For the experimenter-absent
buzzer task, we found an effect of condition [LRT:χ2
(1)
= 6.31, p=
0.012] but no condition × session interaction [LRT: χ2
(1)
= 0.13,
p= 0.718] for the stress signals. Dogs showed more stress signals
in the RI condition compared to the NR condition, again showing
that the dogs potentially noticed the inequity (see Tables 3, 6).
Overall, it seems that dogs were more stressed in the unrewarded
conditions in the experimenter-present buzzer task compared to
the experimenter-absent buzzer task (see Figure 3, Tables 3, 6).
Gazing Behaviors
Since we found a task context × condition interaction on the
average gazing behavior [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 9.22, p= 0.027], we split the
data set up and analyzed the two versions of the task separately.
An effect of condition was found for the experimenter-present
buzzer task [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 15.36, p = 0.002], but we found no
order effect [condition × session interaction: LRT: χ2
(3)
= 1.44,
p = 0.696]. Dogs gazed more toward their partner’s enclosure
in the RI condition compared to the ET baseline (see Figure 4,
Tables 3, 7). For the QI condition we detected only a trend, with
dogs gazing slightly more toward the partner than in the ET
condition. Interestingly, we found that, in addition, those dogs
that gazed more toward their partner’s enclosure in the QI and
RI conditions also refused to press the buzzer at some point
(Spearman correlation: QI: rs =−0.48, p= 0.033, RI: rs =−0.64,
p= 0.002).
In the experimenter-absent buzzer task, we detected an effect of
condition on the gazing behavior [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 18.06, p< 0.001].
This effect was independent of the test session as no condition×
session interaction was observed [LRT: χ2
(3)
= 1.36, p = 0.715].
Dogs gazed more to their partner’s enclosure in the FC and RI
conditions compared to the baseline ET condition (see Figure 4,
Tables 3, 7). Gazing toward the partner’s enclosure was not linked
to the number of buzzer presses in the FC condition, but dogs that
gazed more toward their partner in the RI condition also stopped
pressing the buzzer earlier (Spearman correlation: FC: rs= −0.30,
p = 0.160, RI: rs = −0. 61, p = 0.002). Based on these gazing
behaviors, no reaction to inequity could be observed.
Tolerance Test
As no task context × condition interaction could be detected for
both behaviors coded during the tolerance test [LRT: co-feeding:
χ
2
(3)
= 1.13, p = 0.769, feed alone: χ2
(3)
= 0.87, p = 0.833], we
analyzed the data from both versions of the task combined. We
found no indication of an effect of task context [LRT: co-feeding:
χ
2
(3)
= 0.01, p = 0.910, feed alone: χ2
(3)
= 1.10, p = 0.314], or
condition on co-feeding or feeding alone during the tolerance
tests [LRT: co-feeding: χ2
(3)
= 3.54, p = 0.315, feed alone: χ2
(3)
=
1.26, p = 0.739]. Likewise, no effect of test session was observed
on these tolerance behaviors [LRT: co-feeding: χ2(3) = 1.83, p =
0.176, feed alone: χ2
(3)
= 0.86, p = 0.352]. This indicates that the
dogs did not adjust their co-feeding behavior according to the
previous test condition.
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TABLE 3 | Average occurrence of buzzer presses, buzzer prompts, stress signals, and gaze durations per test condition for experimenter-present and
experimenter-absent version of the buzzer task.
Equity (ET) Food control (FC) Quality inequity (QI) Reward inequity (RI) No-reward control (NR)
Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent
Times buzzer pressed 28.6 ± 0.9 30.0 ± 0.0 25.5 ± 2.2 24.3 ± 2.0 26.8 ± 1.4 30.0 ± 1.0 14.5 ± 1.8 16.3 ± 1.7 15.6 ± 2.2 15.0 ± 1.4
Buzzer prompts 35.05 ± 1.4 36.8 ± 2.2 32.0 ± 2.9 36.7 ± 3.2 33.7 ± 1.1 33.0 ± 0.8 38.8 ± 3.3 37.1 ± 3.0 38.3 ± 3.9 40.8 ± 3.5
Stress signals per trial 0.1 ± 0.0 0.1 ± 0.0 0.3 ± 0.1 0.4 ± 0.1 0.3 ± 0.1 0.1 ± 0.0 0.8 ± 0.1 0.4 ± 0.1 0.4 ± 0.0 0.3 ± 0.1
Gaze duration to partner per trial 1.9 ± 0.4 2.2 ± 0.3 2.1 ± 0.4 4.7 ± 0.9 2.6 ± 0.5 2.3 ± 0.4 3.5 ± 0.5 4.4 ± 0.6 – –
TABLE 4 | Summary of logistic regression model for experimenter-present
and -absent buzzer task comparing number of buzzer pressed across
conditions.
Condition Experimenter-present version Experimenter-absent version
Estimate ± SE p Estimate ± SE p
ET BASELINE
FC −0.07 ± 0.08 0.433 −0.22 ± 0.07 0.003**
QI −0.03 ± 0.08 0.688 0.04 ± 0.07 0.569
RI −0.83 ± 0.09 <0.001** −0.63 ± 0.08 <0.001**
NR BASELINE
RI −0.07 ± 0.10 0.491 0.17 ± 0.08 0.045*
**p < 0.005, *p< 0.05.
TABLE 5 | Summary of linear mixed model output for average stress
signals per trial across dyadic conditions for both versions of the buzzer
task.
Condition Combined
Estimate ± SE p
ET BASELINE
FC 0.13 ± 0.05 0.007**
QI 0.02 ± 0.05 0.752
RI 0.31 ± 0.05 <0.001**
**p < 0.005.
TABLE 6 | Summary of linear mixed model output for average stress
signals per trial across unrewarded conditions for experimenter-present
and -absent versions of the buzzer task.
Condition Experimenter-present version Experimenter-absent version
Estimate ± SE p Estimate ± SE p
NR BASELINE
RI 0.25 ± 0.07 0.002* 0.09 ± 0.04 0.020**
**p < 0.005, *p < 0.05.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the current study was to investigate the function of
the experimenter in an inequity paradigm. In order to explore
this, we ran an inequity task, once involving an interaction
with an experimenter, who was treating the dogs unequally
(experimenter-present version), and once removing this social
aspect, having dogs interact with an apparatus that delivered
food unequally (experimenter-absent version). Contrary to our
predictions, we found that dogs did not react to unequal
treatment in this paradigm, neither when an experimenter was
responsible for inequity nor when a “non-social” setup was used.
Nonetheless, their behavior differed in some important aspects,
showing that dogs responded to the task differently when the
experimenter was visible and actively involved.
In the experimenter-present version of the buzzer task, dogs
stopped pressing the buzzer when they were not being rewarded
(reward inequity, subject receives nothing but partner is given a
high value reward), but they stopped to the same extent when
no partner was present and the subject, likewise, received no
reward (asocial no-reward condition). This indicates that the
inequity in reward outcome was not the key variable affecting
the dogs’ behavior, as the presence of a better-rewarded partner
did not change their performance. Rather it is likely that the
key variable here is presence or absence of an expected reward
regardless of the social setting, consistent with extinction theory.
In addition, they did not show the classic “primate” reaction of
an earlier refusal to work in the quality inequity (i.e., subject
receives low but partner a high value reward) compared to the
equity condition (similar to Range et al., 2009; Brucks et al.,
2016). Nonetheless, dogs gazed more toward their partner in
the reward inequity condition than in the equity condition, also
tending to look more when the partner received a reward of
higher quality (see Table 8 for summary of results). We can rule
out the possibility that dogs were following the movement of the
high quality reward rather than monitoring the partner’s payoff
because firstly, the dogs looked toward their partner less when
the high value reward was moved into the partner’s enclosure
without inducing inequity (as in the food control condition).
Secondly, the dogs that gazed more toward their partner, thereby
increasing their potential to monitor the partner’s payoff, also
stopped pressing the buzzer earlier in the inequity conditions
than dogs that gazed toward their partner less. Furthermore, the
dogs were more stressed when they witnessed that their partner
was rewarded. Taken together, the gazing and stress behavior
patterns suggest that the dogs were able to detect the inequity
but had difficulties in responding to this in a more overt manner
by refusing to continue pressing the buzzer. This may be due to
dogs’ poor inhibitory control; refusing food (any food, whatever
the condition) can be especially taxing for them (e.g., Bray et al.,
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FIGURE 3 | Average number of stress signals per trial across
conditions, comparing the experimenter-present (gray) with the
experimenter-absent (white) buzzer task. Circles show outliers, black bars
indicate median values, whiskers display upper and lower hinge, and boxes
show the interquartile range. ET, equity; FC, food control; QI, quality inequity;
RI, reward inequity; NR, no-reward control.
FIGURE 4 | Average gaze duration to partner enclosure per trial in each
test condition, comparing the experimenter-present (gray) with the
experimenter-absent (white) buzzer task. Circles show outliers, black bars
indicate median values, whiskers display upper and lower hinge, and boxes
show the interquartile range. ET, equity; FC, food control; QI, quality inequity;
RI, reward inequity; NR, no-reward control.
2013; Marshall-Pescini et al., 2015; Brucks et al., in revision).
Nevertheless, the overall behavior of the dogs (i.e., in terms of
buzzer presses and tolerance behavior following the test) was not
consistent with an aversion to inequity in this task. A potential
alternative explanation is that the dogs’ behavioral pattern in
the experimenter-present version of the buzzer task was driven
by individual frustration. However, the results are not entirely
consistent with this view either, as dogs did not react to the
frustrating food control condition and seemed to pay attention
to their partner more during the conditions in which they were
rewarded unequally.
In the experimenter-absent version of the buzzer task, dogs
stopped pressing the buzzer earlier in the reward inequity
condition, and the food control condition, compared to the
baseline equity condition, while they did not show any reaction
to quality inequity. In addition, they gazed more toward their
TABLE 7 | Summary of linear mixed model comparing average gaze to
partner’s enclosure per trials across social conditions in
experimenter-present and -absent version of the buzzer task.
Condition Experimenter-present version Experimenter-absent version
Estimate ± SE p Estimate ± SE p
ET BASELINE
FC 0.05 ± 0.09 0.582 0.25 ± 0.10 0.015*
QI 0.16 ± 0.09 0.068 −0.05 ± 0.10 0.639
RI 0.31 ± 0.09 <0.001** 0.30 ± 0.10 0.004**
**p < 0.005, *p < 0.05.
partner, and showed more stress signals, in the reward inequity
but also in the food control condition (see Table 8 for a summary
of results). While those dogs that monitored their partner for
a longer time refused to press the buzzer earlier in the reward
inequity condition, no correlation was found between the gazing
behavior in the food control and the equity condition. This
indicates that the dogs looked at their partner in unexpected
situations (e.g., when receiving no reward or a reward of lower
quality than expected) but were getting frustrated when their
individual expectations were not being met (similar to squirrel
monkeys Talbot et al., 2011, and cottontop tamarins Neiworth
et al., 2009). Interestingly, dogs were more inclined to work, but
also more stressed, when their partner was present compared to
when they were tested alone. This suggests that, in addition to
the frustration/contrast effect, dogs were also affected by social
facilitation, as the partner dog’s presence enhanced the propensity
of the subject to continue working although no reward was
obtained (see also Dubreuil et al., 2006; Hopper et al., 2013). In
line with this, the social tolerance of dogs toward their partner
in the food tolerance test was not affected by the treatment in
the preceding test condition, as dogs based their refusal on their
own expectations rather than comparing it with their partner’s
outcome in the experimenter-absent buzzer task.
These results do not support our predictions, as we could not
elicit a clear response to inequity using the current experimental
setup. Nonetheless, removing the experimenter from the setup
seems to cause dogs to base their refusals on individual reward
expectations rather than socially comparing rewards, hence,
indicating that the experimenter seems to play some role
in inequity tasks. Studies in humans have shown that the
intentionality of reward distributions (Blount, 1995; Hachiga
et al., 2009; Sloane and Premack, 2012) plays a major role in the
rejection rate of unequal offers. If an offer is not attributable to a
person and is only caused by a non-social or chance event, people
will show no self-interest because no normative expectations are
violated (Blount, 1995). Given that the buzzer paradigm did not
elicit inequity aversion in the first place, we cannot draw any
conclusion about the exact role of the experimenter; however,
the dogs behaved differently when an experimenter was causing
the inequity compared to the experimenter-absent buzzer task in
which no experimenter was visible. In combination with earlier
results, which revealed that dogs show a differential effect toward
the experimenter depending on test condition (i.e., avoidance of
the experimenter after unequal treatment in terms of quantity
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TABLE 8 | Summary of effects in experimenter-present and -absent version of the buzzer task.
Variable Experimenter-present version Experimenter-absent version
Trials completed equity > reward inequity equity > reward inequity; equity > contrast; asocial no-reward < reward inequity
Stress behaviors equity > reward inequity; equity > contrast; asocial no-reward > reward inequity
Gaze to partner’s enclosure equity < reward inequity; equity < quality inequityx equity < contrast; equity < reward inequity
xOnly tendency.
and quality, Brucks et al., 2016), we can cautiously suggest that
the experimenter plays a central role in eliciting inequity aversion
since, in his/her absence, dogs based their behavior on individual
expectations. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that we
manipulated not only the presence of the experimenter but also
removed the entire interaction between experimenter and dogs
in the experimenter-absent task; hence, it would be interesting
to investigate how dogs’ perception of the task differs if only
the interaction component is manipulated (i.e., experimenter is
present but not interacting with dogs).
Nonetheless, these results raise the question of why this
paradigm could not elicit inequity aversion, a behavior, which
dogs have shown in other studies using a paw-giving paradigm
(Range et al., 2009; Brucks et al., 2016). The test procedure
for the buzzer task differed from the previously used paw task
in two aspects: firstly, there was no direct interaction with the
experimenter (paw task: give paw in hand palm; vs. buzzer task:
placing paw on top of the buzzer). And secondly, the dogs did not
directly interact with the experimenter when they received the
reward (paw task: receiving reward from the hand vs. buzzer task:
receiving reward from two bowls). As previously demonstrated,
differences in the experimental setup can strongly affect the
animals’ reaction to inequity (i.e., rewards for token exchange
e.g., Brosnan and deWaal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010a vs. rewards
for “free” e.g., Bräuer et al., 2006; Roma et al., 2006). In the current
study, like in other setups, the dogs were placed directly next to
each other and had sufficient visual contact to observe each other
during the test. Also, we ensured that dogs understood the task
(i.e., pressing the buzzer) through careful training, as seen in the
low refusal rates in the rewarded conditions. Furthermore, in a
recent study using the same buzzer paradigm with pack living
wolves and dogs, dogs showed an aversion to inequity (Essler
et al., submitted). More specifically, dogs stopped pressing the
buzzer when they were not rewarded and did so earlier when
they saw their partner getting a reward compared to the asocial
condition, in which no partner was present. In addition, they
tended to stop pressing the buzzer when they received a reward
of lower quality than their partner.
In most respects, the two procedures were identical; however,
two, potentially crucial, aspects differed. Firstly, in the study by
Essler et al. (submitted) animals were tested by their trainer/care-
giver; hence, they had an established, positive relationship with
the experimenter. Given that familiarity has an impact on dogs’
motivation to work (e.g., Prato-Previde et al., 2008; Cunningham
and Ramos, 2014), it might be the case that the dogs worked
longer for their familiar trainer, especially in the non-rewarded
condition, due to a positive training history with them. In order
to rule out this familiarity explanation, we ran an additional
control condition, in which we re-tested dogs previously tested
with the experimenter but this time with their owners giving
the buzzer commands and rewarding them (see Supplementary
Material for details of procedure and results). We found that,
even with their owners, dogs did not react to the unequal
treatment. The second crucial aspect that was different between
the current buzzer task and the study by Essler et al. (submitted)
is the fact that, in the latter study, the animals were rewarded by
hand from a single shared bowl. Accordingly, this leaves only one
explanation for the lack of response to inequity in the buzzer task
paradigm: the reward delivery method.
Most studies utilizing an exchange task to investigate inequity
aversion stored the rewards in two bowls, with the bowls differing
in reward quality, in front of the animals. The rewards were
handed out from both bowls (depending on the test condition) by
the experimenter (e.g., Brosnan and deWaal, 2003; Brosnan et al.,
2005; Fontenot et al., 2007; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). In order
to facilitate the reward visibility and traceability for the dogs,
we deliberately chose to deliver the rewards in separate bowls.
Using one or two shared bowls instead of separate bowls for each
individual is likely to increase the competition between partners.
Consequently, the reward deliverymethod we chosemay have led
dogs to perceive the task more as an individual task reducing the
competition with the partner for rewards. Given that each dog
had its own set of baited bowls in front of the enclosure, they may
have worked primarily to gain access to “their” bowls instead of
monitoring and keeping track of the partner’s outcome as well.
Additionally, in Essler et al.’s study the dogs were rewarded by
giving the reward directly out of the hand instead of using bowls,
thus, dogs may have perceived the task as more cooperative
since, in addition to the verbal and gestural buzzer command,
the subsequent reward delivery was more socially interactive
than in our experimenter-present task, in which the reward
was delivered via bowls. Given that inequity aversion has been
proposed to act as a mechanism to stabilize cooperation (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Brosnan, 2011), it may be necessary to create
a situation that is perceived as cooperative (i.e., the goal should be
shared) in order to induce inequity aversion. In addition, inequity
aversion should be relevant only in a social context (i.e., dyadic
interactions between subjects (e.g., bar-pulling paradigm, Cronin
and Snowdon, 2008; Massen et al., 2012), triadic interaction
with an experimenter (e.g., token exchange paradigm, Brosnan
and de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010a) according to the
hypothesized link between inequity aversion and cooperation
(Brosnan, 2011). Consequently, paradigms investigating inequity
aversion might involve two important aspects: on the one hand,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 270
Brucks et al. Inequity Aversion in Dogs
animals are competing with the partner for the rewards; however,
they are also potentially cooperating with the experimenter in the
case of token-exchange paradigm or directly cooperating with
a partner in the bar-pulling paradigm to obtain rewards. If one
of those requirements is not fulfilled (i.e., lack of a competitive
component in buzzer paradigm, lack of cooperative component
in paradigms that do not involve investment of effort, e.g.,
Dubreuil et al., 2006; Roma et al., 2006), the paradigm may
not elicit inequity aversion. In fact, the addition of the visible
experimenter in the experimenter-present buzzer task may have
caused dogs to perceive the task as a more cooperative one,
explaining their increased sensitivity to the partner’s outcome
(e.g., increased gazing and stress behaviors); however, the lack
of a competitive component (shared bowl) may have limited
the extent to which the subject perceived and reacted to
the unequal treatment. Consequently, future research will be
needed to elucidate the importance of cooperation/competition
for regulating the response to unequal treatment in inequity
paradigms. This could be investigated, for example, by using a
paradigm that is known to elicit inequity aversion, such as the
paw-giving paradigm for dogs (e.g., Range et al., 2009) or the
exchange paradigm for primates (e.g., Brosnan and de Waal,
2003), and testing how individuals react to unequal treatment if
rewards are delivered and stored in separate bowls, one set per
individual.
In conclusion, we suggest that a social and potentially
cooperative interaction with either an experimenter or directly
with a partner is needed in order to elicit inequity aversion;
however, a competitive element may also be necessary. Future
research is needed to understand the effects of cooperation
and competition in governing inequity aversion. In addition,
it remains to be seen whether similar results are found in
other species or whether the unique relationship between dogs
and humans makes the interaction with the experimenter more
significant for dogs than for other species.
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